

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SECTO 32046 01 OF 04 092137Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSC-05
DODE-00 H-01 IO-13 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
CCO-00 /073 W

----- 065754

O R 091956Z DEC 76 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 SECTO 32046

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) PFOR, PGOV, WB, GW, FR, UK, US
SUBJECT: DECEMBER 1976 QUADRIpartite MEETING ON BERLIN AND GERMANY:
REPORT OF SENIOR LEVEL MEETING

BEGIN SUMMARY. AT THE SENIOR LEVEL MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON THE
MORNING OF DEC 8, AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON REVISED COMMUNIQUE
LANGUAGE ON BERLIN. THE BERLIN ASSESSMENT WAS APPROVED, AND GUIDE-
LINES WERE AGREED FOR USE OF THE BONN GROUP BRIEFING PAPER ON THE
BERLIN SITUATION, FOR WHICH AN AMENDED TEXT WAS APPROVED.
GENERAL AGREEMENT WAS ALSO REACHED ON THE OPTIONS SECTION OF THE
BONN GROUP STUDY ON PROBLEMS IN THE REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN
INTERESTS ABROAD, AND SENIOR OFFICIALS GAVE FINAL APPROVAL TO THE
TEXT OF THAT SECTION LATER IN THE DAY, AFTER A WORKING GROUP HAD
AGREED ON AMENDMENTS PROPOSED BY THE UK AND FRANCE.

DISCUSSION AT THE SENIOR LEVEL MEETING OF THE GDR INTERNAL
SITUATION, FRG/GDR AND FRG/USSR RELATIONS AS THEY AFFECT
BERLIN, AND BERLIN/EC PROBLEMS IS REPORTED BY SEPTELS. END SUMMARY

1. THE QUADRIpartite SENIOR LEVEL MEETING ON BERLIN AND GERMANY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SECTO 32046 01 OF 04 092137Z

WAS HELD IN THE UK MISSION TO NATO AT 1100 DEC 8. DELEGATIONS

WERE HEADED BY HIBBERT (UK-CHAIRMAN), HARTMAN AND SONNENFELDT (US), ANDREANI (FRANCE), AND VAN WELL (FRG). DISCUSSION WAS KEYED TO THE FOLLOWING AGENDA:

A. COMMUNIQUE PASSAGE ON BERLIN AND GERMANY

B. ASSESSMENT OF BERLIN SITUATION

C. BRIEFING PROJECT

D. BONN GROUP STUDY ON REPRESENTATION OF BERLIN INTERESTS ABROAD

E. FRG/GDR AND FRG/USSR RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF BERLIN

F. BERLIN/EC RELATIONS

COMMUNIQUE

2. HIBBERT NOTED THAT THERE WERE TWO ISSUES LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IN THE BERLIN PASSAGE AS WORKED OUT IN THE BONN GROUP (BONN 20194) -- USAGE OF THE WORD DETENTE, AND THE DESCRIPTION IN THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE FRG. COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT CIRCULATED A SUGGESTED REVISION OF THE BERLIN PASSAGE, AND EXPLAINED ITS RATIONALE.

3. MR SONNENFELDT STATED THAT THE SECURITY AND VIABILITY OF BERLIN WERE ESSENTIAL REGARDLESS OF THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND IN FACT WOULD BE MORE ESSENTIAL IF THERE WERE NO DETENTE. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT IT BETTER TO STATE FLATLY THAT THE SECURITY AND VIABILITY WERE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF WESTERN POLICY. ANDREANI EXPRESSED STRONG PREFERENCE FOR USE OF THE WORD DETENTE SOMEWHERE IN THE COMMUNIQUE. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE TO REITERATE THE ARGUMENT MADE FOR MANY YEARS, THAT THE SECURITY AND VIABILITY OF BERLIN WERE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DETENTE. VAN WELL SUGGESTED THAT BOTH ASPECTS BE REFLECTED, AND THIS WAS ACCEPTED.

4. SONNENFELDT ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE THIRD PARAGRAPH BE PHRASED TO NOTE THAT, WHILE BERLIN'S TIES TO THE RG WERE OF CRUCIAL SIGNIFICANCE, THERE WERE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH BERLIN MUST BENEFIT FROM DETENTE. THE REVISED PASSAGE WAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SECTO 32046 01 OF 04 092137Z

ACCEPTED AFTER MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF VAN WELL'S INSTINCE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE SERVE ALSO AS A SIGNAL THAT WE DID NOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET VIEW, AS EXPRESSED IN ARTICLE VII OF THE 1975 SOVIET/GDR TREATY, THAT BERLIN SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN DETENTE AS AN INDEPENDENT POLITICAL ENTITY. THE FINAL TEXT OF THE BERLIN PASSAGE AS APPROVED BY MINISTERS AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER IS REPORTED IN SECTO 32023.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SECTO 32046 02 OF 04 092255Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSC-05
DODE-00 H-01 IO-13 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
CCO-00 /073 W

----- 067034

O R 091956Z DEC 76
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 4 SECTO 32046

BERLIN ASSESSMENT

3. NOTING THAT THE ASSESSMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN USED AS THE BASIS FOR BRIEFING NATO ON THE BERLIN SITUATION, HIBBERT SUGGESTED THAT IT BE APPROVED TACITLY. VAN WELL EXPRESSED CONGRATULATIONS TO THE BONN GROUP FOR HAVING PRODUCED AN EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AND SAID HIS SUPERIORS HAD BEEN IMPRESSED WITH IT. HIBBERT THOUGHT ALL SENIOR OFFICIALS COULD ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH VAN WELL'S REMARKS.

4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN SAID HE WOULD WISH TO UNDERLINE THE STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 14 OF THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE GREATEST PROBLEM FOR THE FUTURE IS LIKELY TO BE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BERLIN AND THE EC. HE THOUGHT WE WOULD WISH TO GIVE PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THAT PROBLEM.

BRIEFING PROJECT

5. HIBBERT NOTED THAT THERE WERE QUESTIONS BOTH AS TO THE TEXT OF THE PAPER PREPARED BY THE BONN GROUP FOR BRIEFING THIRD COUNTRIES ON THE BERLIN SITUATION AND AS TO THE USAGE OF THE PAPER.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SECTO 32046 02 OF 04 092255Z

HIBBERT REQUESTED AND OBTAINED AGREEMENT TO THREE TEXTUAL CHANGES (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY).

6. ON UTILIZATION OF THE PAPER, HARTMAN STATED THAT THE US HAD IN MIND APPROACHING A SELECTED GROUP OF COUNTRIES WHERE WE HAVE HAD OR ARE LIKELY TO HAVE BERLIN PROBLEMS. HE THOUGH THE BEST APPROACH WOULD BE FOR THE BONN GROUP TO WORK OUT A LIST OF COUNTRIES AND A DIVISION OF BRIEFING RESPONSIBILITY AMONG THE FOUR. HE ALSO THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE THOSE WHO WERE BEING BRIEFED WITH COPIES NOT ONLY OF THE COVERING MEMORANDUM BUT ALSO OF THE ANNEX, WHICH CONTAINS DETAILS ON THE MOST FREQUENT PROBLEMS.

7. VAN WELL SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED FIRST GIVING THE STUDY TO SOME OF THE COUNTRIES THAT WERE CONSISTENTLY HELPFUL TO US IN DEFENDING BERLIN'S INTERESTS, SUCH AS THE NATO PARTNERS AND IRELAND. MOST FREQUENT DIFFICULTIES OCCURRED IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, BUT HE WOULD AGREE THAT WE SHOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE STARTING A CAMPAIGN BY GOING TO ALL THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AT THE SAME TIME. HE SUGGESTED SENDING THE STUDY TO MISSIONS OF THE FOUR COUNTRIES TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THEIR OWN BACKGROUND. IF THOSE MISSIONS THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE FORMALLY TO TRANSMIT THE PAPER TO THE SECRETARIATS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THEY WOULD FIRST SEEK INSTRUCTIONS AND THE MATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE BONN GROUP ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. HE ALSO THOUGHT THE STUDY MIGHT BE SENT TO EMBASSIES OF THE FOUR IN COUNTRIES WHERE IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR BACKGROUND.

8. HIBBERT SAID THE UK HAD NOT HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS HAVING ALL THAT MUCH SUCCESS IN MAKING ITS POINTS OR THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS ALL THAT WEAK. HE WAS NOT ANXIOUS TO ENTER INTO A DISPUTE WITH THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE BODIES OF THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AS IT WERE. WHILE THE PAPER WAS VALUABLE FOR BRIEFING OUR OWN MISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS TO CONFERENCES, HE WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE IT TOO BROAD DISTRIBUTION. THIS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONTROLLED, SO IT WOULD NOT GO IMMEDIATELY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND STIMULATE COUNTERBLASTS.

9. ANDREANI SAID HE THOUGHT THE BONN GROUP HAD DONE AN EXCELLENT JOB AND THAT THE STUDY WOULD BE USEFUL FOR INFORMING STATES THAT HAD DOUBTS AND DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE LEGAL PROBLEMS. WHILE SEEING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SECTO 32046 02 OF 04 092255Z

DIFFICULTIES IN STARTING A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN IN THIRD COUNTRIES, HE THOUGHT OUR MISSIONS AND DELEGATIONS COULD DRAW ON THE TEXT

TO INFORM INTERLOCUTORS IN THIRD COUNTRIES ORALLY OF OUR POSITIONS.

10. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, HIBBERT OFFERED THE FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF ACTION AGREED UPON, WHICH WAS ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER WITHOUT DISSENT:

-- THE BONN GROUP WILL BE ASKED TO DRAW UP A LIST OF COUNTRIES WHERE THE STUDY MIGHT EFFECTIVELY BE USED.

-- THE STUDY WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO EMBASSIES OF THE FOUR AROUND THE WORLD AND TO MISSIONS OF THE FOUR TO THOSE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WHICH THE BONN GROUP MAY DESIGNATE.

-- WHEN PROBLEMS ARISE IN A GIVEN COUNTRY OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FOUR WILL CONSULT AND AGREE ON THE BEST WAY OF HANDLING THE PROBLEM. IF THEY CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO PROVIDE A COPY OF THE STUDY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, THEY WILL S RECOMMEND, AND THE QUESTION WILL BE CONSIDERED QUICKLY IN THE BONN GROUP.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SECTO 32046 03 OF 04 092304Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07
NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSC-05
DODE-00 H-01 IO-13 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
CCO-00 /073 W

----- 067180

O R 091956Z DEC 76 ZFF-6

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION BERLIN

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 4 SECTO 32046

REPRESENTATION STUDY

11. REFERRING TO THE UK REQUEST FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE STUDY ON REPRESENTATION WHICH HAD BEEN CIRCULATED IN THE BONN GROUP ON DEC 3 AND DEC 6, HIBBERT SAID HE ASSUMED THERE WAS NO DESIRE TO GET INTO TEXTUAL CHANGES AT THE SENIOR LEVEL MEETING. HE SUGGESTED THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS AGREE ON THE GENERAL LINES OF THE STUDY, THEN REMAND IT TO THE BONN GROUP FOR FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE TEXT. VAN WELL OBJECTED, STATING THAT CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY WAS AN URGENT ITEM OF BUSINESS. HE NOTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY PRESENTED IT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE CHANCELLOR, BOTH OF WHOM HAD BEEN "VERY HAPPY" WITH IT. THE IDEA OF REFERRING THE PAPER BACK TO THE BONN GROUP FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION CAME AS A SURPRISE TO HIM. IT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE SUBMITTED TO FOREIGN MINISTERS AT THE QUADRIPARTITE DINNER THAT EVENING, AND HE IN FACT EXPECTED GENSCHER TO BRING IT UP.

12. ANDREANI STATED THAT, IF THE TEXT WERE BEING REOPENED, THE FRENCH WOULD ALSO HAVE THREE OR FOUR AMENDMENTS TO SUGGEST. HE SUGGESTED AS A SOLUTION THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS CONCENTRATE ON PART III (OPTIONS) AND SEEK AGREEMENT ON THAT PART. VAN WELL
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SECTO 32046 03 OF 04 092304Z

REPEATED THAT GENSCHER WAS PREPARED TO MAKE A STATEMENT TO HIS COLLEAGUES THAT EVENING THAT WOULD REFER TO THE STUDY, AND HE URGED THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS NOT REPORT TO MINISTERS THAT THE STUDY WAS NOT YET FINISHED. WHEN HIBBERT OFFERED THE THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR GREAT DELAY AND THAT THE BONN GROUP COULD WRAP IT UP IN THE NEXT WEEK OR TWO, VAN WELL ADDED THAT GENSCHER CONSIDERED THE STUDY THE CENTER OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETING.

13. HARTMAN AGREED WITH ANDREANI THAT SENIOR OFFICIAL SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON A DISCUSSION OF PART III, THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE STUDY. IT WAS THEN AGREED THAT OFFICIALS WOULD IN FACT DISCUSS THE MAIN LINES OF THE OPTIONS SECTION, AND THAT OFFICIALS FROM CAPITALS AND BONN GROUP MEMBERS WOULD RECONVENE IN THE AFTER-NOON TO ATTEMPT TO REACH FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE EXT OF PART III.

14. ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE OPTIONS PRESENTED IN THE STUDY, VAN WELL SAID THAT THE PAPER WAS EXCELLENT, WITH A CONCISE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND WITH OPTIONS WHICH SET OUT A FUTURE STRATEGY THAT WAS REALISTIC, PRAGMATIC, AND LOW KEY. IT WOULD BE HARMFUL FOR THE INTERESTS OF BERLIN, VAN WELL CONTINUED, IF BERLIN WERE TO BECOME A BLOCK TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. THIS WAS A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR THE FRG BECAUSE OF ITS INABILITY TO SIGN BILATERAL TREATIES WITHOUT FULL INCLUSION OF BERLIN. IN THE MULTILATERAL FIELD, HE SAW REASON FOR HOPE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD REALIZE THAT SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES THEY WERE CREATING WERE SIMPLY THE RESULT OF BUREAUCRATIC OVERKILL.

16. IN ANY CASE, VAN WELL SAID, NOW WAS THE TIME TO MOVE FORWARD.

THE FRG AND THE THREE ALLIES SHOULD PRESENT COORDINATED BRIEFING PAPERS TO THEIR TOP OFFICIALS; HE WOULD WANT TO TELL THE CHANCELLOR THAT THIS STUDY REPRESENTED AN AGREED POSITION. HE NOTED ALSO FREQUENT REFERENCES IN THE PRESS TO DIFFERENCES OF OPINION, BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE ALLIES AND BETWEEN THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE CHANCELLERY. IT WAS HIGH TIME TO END THIS AND TO HAVE A SOLID, AGREED PAPER TO WORK FROM. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO SAY AFTER THE QUADRIPARTITE MINISTERIAL MEETING -- THOUGH NOT PUBLICLY -- THAT WE HAD EACHED AN AGREED POSITION.

17. IN COMMENTING GENERALLY ON THE STUDY, HARTMAN OBSERVED THAT ONE PAST DIFFICULTY HAD BEEN THAT ISSUES HAD BEEN RAISED IN A WAY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 SECTO 32046 03 OF 04 092304Z

WHICH DID NOT TAKE ACCOUNT OF OUR BASIC INTERESTS IN BERLIN. SOME OF OUR PAST PROBLEMS, SUCH AS PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT DIFFERENCES AMONG THE FOUR, HAD STEMMED FROM A LACK OF COORDINATION OR A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF THE APPROACHES WE WERE TAKING. HE THOUGHT THE OPTIONS IN THE REPRESENTATION STUDY LAID OUT A LINE THAT WE ALL COULD FOLLOW AND PROVIDED A BASIS FOR PROCEEDING IN THE FUTURE, WHILE ALLOWING FOR FLEXIBILITY IN TACTICS. THE VALUE OF THE STUDY WAS THAT IT GAVE A MUCH BETTER INDICATION OF THE GENERAL DIRECTION IN WHICH WE WERE PROCEEDING, EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT SETTLE ALL THE ISSUES.

18. ANDREANI AGREED WITH HARTMAN'S COMMENTS AND THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INFORM MINISTERS THAT EVENING THAT SENIOR OFFICIALS WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE OPTIONS. HE THOUGHT THE TEXT WAS GOOD IN DRAWING A LINE ON WHAT ACTION WAS FEASIBLE. THE LANGUAGE DEALING WITH THE EC WAS VERY GENERAL, ANDREANI NOTED, AND FURTHER DISCUSSION AIMED AT CLARIFYING VIEWS -- NOT AT CHANGING THE PAPER -- WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT ALL KNEW WHAT WAS MEANT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 SECTO 32046 04 OF 04 092242Z

73

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-04 INR-07 L-03 ACDA-07

NSAE-00 PA-01 SS-15 PRS-01 SP-02 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 NSC-05

DODE-00 H-01 IO-13 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

CCO-00 /073 W

----- 066859

O R 091956Z DEC 76 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 4 SECTO 32046

19. ASKED TO COMMENT ON THE CHANGES THE BRITISH WERE SUGGESTING, HIBBERT NOTED THAT PARAGRAPH 22, CONCERNING OPTIONS FOR INCLUDING BERLIN IN FUTURE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS, WAS A KEY SECTION. THE ORIGINAL BONN GROUP VERSION HAD BEEN TOO DETAILED, AND THE BRITISH WERE PROPOSING A MUCH MORE GENERAL TREATMENT OF THE MATTER.

20. VAN WELL POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE DANGERS IN THE PROPOSED BRITISH REDRAFT, WHICH STATED SIMPLY THAT BERLIN SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED FROM THE ENJOYMENT OF BENEFITS SECURED BY THE WEST IN FUTURE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT PROVOKE UNNECESSARY CONFRONTATION. VAN WELL THOUGHT THAT THIS PASSAGE EITHER MEANT VERY LITTLE, OR ELSE MEANT THAT WE SHOULD CHANGE PRESENT METHODS OF HANDLING THE PROBLEMS, FOR EXAMPLE, BY APPROVING DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THE SENAT. HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO ENDORSE PARAGRAPH 22 AS REDRAFTED BY THE UK, AND HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED ON THE ORIGINAL BONN GROUP VERSION OF THAT PARAGRAPH. HIBBERT RESPONDED THAT HE TOOK VAN WELL'S POINTS AND THOUGHT IT SHOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT TO AGREE ON A SATISFACTORY TEXT, WERE IT NOT FOR THE SHORTAGE OF TIME. HE COMMENTED THAT THE FACT THAT THE TEXT HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED BY THE BONN GROUP COULD NOT MEAN THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 SECTO 32046 04 OF 04 092242Z

IT WAS ENDORSED BY GOVERNMENTS, AS BONN GROUP REPS DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO GO BEYOND THE ATTITUDES OF THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTS.

21. VAN WELL EXPANDED ON HIS OBJECTION TO THE UK REDRAFT, SUGGESTING THAT, WHILE WE NEED A NEW STRATEGY FOR BREAKING THE IMPASSE WHICH HAS DEVELOPED, WE SHOULD NOT DO SO BY ALTERING THE CLEAR LINE THAT HAS BEEN FOLLOWED SINCE 1952/54. NOR DID THE FRG HAVE SUFFICIENT LEVERAGE TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM ALONE, AND IT WOULD WANT TO PROCEED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF COORDINATED POSITIONS AND THE ACTIVE SUPPORT OF THE THREE ALLIES. NOTING THAT THE UK DRAFT WAS A CALL FOR FLEXIBLE AND PRAGMATIC APPROACHES, VAN WELL OBSERVED

THAT THE FRANK-FALIN CLAUSE HAD BEEN ONE ATTEMPT AT PRAGMATISM WHICH THE FRG HAD REGRETTEED EVER SENCE. THE FRANK-FALIN FORMULA HAD TURNED OUT TO BE AN EMPTY ONE. HE THEREFORE URGED THAT WE BE FARLY SPECIFIC IN DESCRIBING OPTIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION.

22. HIBBERT CHARACTERIZED THE STATEMENT VAN WELL HAD JUST MADE AS AN IMPORTANT ONE AND STATED THAT HE COULD FULLY SUPPORT THE AIM OF WORKING TOGETHER TO DEBLOCK THE SITUATION. HE SUGGESTED THAT AN EFFORT BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE PASSAGE IN QUESTION AT THE AFTERNOON SESSION.

23. IN THE AFTERNOON, DELEGATIONS HEADED BY GOODALL (UK), PLAISANT (FRANCE), LUECKING (FRG) AND GERMAN (US) MET TO CONSIDER REVISIONS TO THE TEXT OF SECTION III OF THE STUDY. FULL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, WITH PARAGRAPH 22, DISCUSSED ABOVE, LEFT BASICALLY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BONN GROUP TEXT WITH ONE IMPORTANT MODIFICATION, WHICH WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT CONTEMPLATED THAT ALL FUTURE EAST-WEST AGREEMENTS (ALLIED REPS HAD IN MIND SPECIFICALLY MBFR) WOULD NECESSARILY BE APPROPRIATE FOR EXTENSION TO BERLIN. THE REVISED TEXT OF SECTION III WAS CIRCULATED TO SENIOR OFFICIALS AND APPROVED BY THEM BEFORE PRESENTATION TO MINISTERS AT THE QUADRIPARTITE

DINNER. THE REVISED TEXT WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY.

24. SEPTELS FOLLOW ON DISCUSSION AT SENIOR LEVEL MEETING OF THE INTERNAL GDR SITUATION, FRG/GDR RELATIONS, FRG/USSR RELATIONS, AND BERLIN/EC PROBLEMS. KISSINGER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, SECTO, BERLIN QUADRIpartite MATTERS, MEETING REPORTS, COMMUNIQUEs
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 DEC 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976SECTO32046
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: RR
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760455-0780
From: SECRETARY BRUSSELS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19761258/aaaabxrg.tel
Line Count: 466
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: GolinoFR
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 APR 2004 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <06 APR 2004 by GolinoFR>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: DECEMBER 1976 QUADRIpartite MEETING ON BERLIN AND GERMANY: REPORT OF SENIOR LEVEL MEETING BEGIN SUMMARY.
AT THE SENIOR LEVEL MEETING IN BRUS
TAGS: OVIP, PFOR, PGOV, WB, GE, FR, UK, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: SECSTATE WASHDC BONN BERLIN LONDON MOSCOW PARIS BERLIN NATO
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006